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SBC COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. FCC: DOES SECTION 271
OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 CONSTITUTE
A BILL OF ATTAINDER AGAINST THE BELL OPERATING
COMPANIES?
Thomas A. Buckley
Mr. President, today I am introducing the Communica-
tions Act of 1994, the first comprehensive rewrite of
communications law since the original Communica-
tions Act was passed in 1934 .... The Communications
Act of 1994 will bring order out of chaos in the commu-
nications industry .... The bill also gives authority over
the question of long-distance entry by the Bell compa-
nies to the FCC, in consultation with the Attorney Gen-
eral. It is important to permit the Bell companies to
enter the field of long distance once they establish that
there is competition for local telephone exchange ser-
vice. Although neither the Bell companies nor the
long-distance industry will be completely pleased with
the approach taken in this bill, the standard this bill
includes establishes a reasonable policy based on com-
petition and the public interest.'
The Telecommunications Act of 19962 ("1996
Act") was intended to be a comprehensive legisla-
tive mechanism which would ensure competition
in the local telephone exchange market as
America enters a new century of communications
service. 3 The raison d'etre of the 1996 Act is to in-
crease competition within the local telephone ser-
vice industry.4 The 1996 Act required Incumbent
140 CONG. REc. S771-72, (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1994) (state-
ment of Sen. Hollings).
2 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 86 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151).
3 See S. CONF. ReP. No. 104-230, at 113 (1996); see generally
Jim Chen, The Legal Process and Political Economy of Telecommu-
nications Reform, 97 COLUM. L. Riv. 835 (1997) (providing a
detailed discussion of the history of telecommunications
law).
4 See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (Supp. 1997).
5 See id.
6 See In re Implementation of the Telecommunications,
Act of 1996 Accounting Safeguards Under the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 17539
(1996). Prior to the 1982 Modification of Final Judgment,
AT&T commanded a triple bottleneck monopoly over the
telephone industry. That is, it controlled production of
phone equipment, local service, and long distance service.
See United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 160-63
(D.D.C. 1982), aff'd Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001
Local Exchange Carriers ("ILECs") to open their
markets to competition through elimination of
the historical barriers to entry which have plagued
the telecommunications marketplace for the past
century.
5
Furthermore, the Bell Operating Companies
("BOCs"), which control the local networks in the
majority of urban areas where the consumer's tel-
ephone calls originate and terminate would be al-
lowed to enter new telecommunications markets.6
Specifically, Congress placed various obligations
on the BOCs through Sections 271-75 of the 1996
Act. 7 In return for meeting these obligations, the
BOCs would be allowed to enter the lucrative
long distance market.8 They would also be al-
lowed to enter markets from which they have
been limited from entering for decades such as
data services and alarm monitoring services.9
On December 31, 1997, however, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of
(1983).
7 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 271-75 (Supp. 1997).
8 See id.; see also AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 160-63 (barring
the BOCs from-the long distance industry).
9 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 273-75 (Supp. 1997); see also Bryan
Gruley & Stephanie N. Mehta, FCC Offers to Ty to Help Baby
Bells, WALL ST. J.,Jan. 15, 1998, at A3. The long distance in-
dustry is an $80 billion market. See Mike Mills, Ruling Would
Let Bells into Long-Distance, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 1998, at Al.
Note that the long distance restrictions only apply to service
to customers within the BOCs' in-region states. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 271(b) (Supp. 1997). An in-region state is defined as any
state in which a BOC is permitted to provide local service to
as a result of the 1982 Consent Decree. See id. § 271(i).
LATA is defined as local access and transport area. Gener-
ally, these are the local areas the BOCs were allowed to ser-
vice as a result of the 1982 Consent Decree. See id.
§ 153(25). Further, the 1996 Act permits the BOCs to begin
immediate sale of long-distance service to cellular customers.
See id. § 271(b) (3) and § 27 1(g) (3 ).
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
Texas held in SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC ,
that Sections 271-75 of the 1996 Act constituted
an unconstitutional bill of attainder which auto-
matically found the BOCs guilty of antitrust viola-
tions without a judicial hearing.1' The court held
that the 1996 Act embodied a legislative intent to
punish the BOCs by restricting them from imme-
diate entry into the long distance market in their
respective local access and transport areas
("LATAs"). 12 The intent of Sections 271-75, the
court held, was based on the notion that the
BOCs would commit future antitrust violations.' 3
Section I of this Note examines the history of
the BOCs in the telecommunications industry.
Section II summarizes the District Court's deci-
sion in SBC Communications. Section III traces the
history of the Bill of Attainder Clause from its
roots in "strict historicism" to the present
Supreme Court's analysis based on "restrained
functionalism."' 4 Notably, this Section addresses
the patchwork of Supreme Court decisions that
have neglected to provide the Bill of Attainder
Clause any constitutional significance beyond pro-
tection of disfavored groups from legislative per-
secution. Finally, Section IV takes issue with the
reasoning of the District Court's application of
the Bill of Attainder Clause to Sections 271-75 of
the 1996 Act and argues that the lower court in-
correctly found that the sections were unconstitu-
tional.
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE BELL
OPERATING COMPANIES IN THE
TELEPHONE INDUSTRY
A. The Modification of Final Judgment
The BOCs stronghold over local service was re-
inforced by Judge Harold Greene in his 1982
Consent Decree 1 5 settling a 1974 antitrust lawsuit
between AT&T and the Department of Justice
("DOJ"). 16 The DOJ contended that AT&T vio-
lated the Sherman Antitrust Act 1 7 by using its per-
vasive market power to block competitors from
providing telephone service.1 8 The AT&T Con-
sent Decree, or the Modification of Final Judg-
ment ("1982 MFJ") required that AT&T divest it-
self of the twenty-two Bell Operating Companies'
by 1984.9
The 1982 MFJ imposed certain "line-of-busi-
ness" restrictions on the BOCs. 2 0 Specifically, the
restrictions prohibited the BOCs from providing
long distance service, manufacturing telecommu-
nications equipment, manufacturing customer
premises equipment (e.g., telephones, answering
machines, etc.), providing information services,
electronic publishing, and alarm services.2 1 The
line-of-business restrictions, however, allowed the
BOCs to retain their monopolies in local ex-
change service.
2 2
10 981 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
11 See id. at 1008. Bills of attainder are defined as,
"[liegislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply
either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable mem-
bers of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on
them without a judicial trial." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 165
(6th ed. 1990) (citing United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,
448-49 (1965)).
12 See SBC Communications, 981 F. Supp. at 1007.
13 See id.
14 See generally Thomas B. Griffith, Beyond Process: A Sub-
stantive Rationale for the Bill of Attainder Clause, 70 VA. L. RE-v.
475 (1984) [hereinafter Griffith] (defining historicism as the
narrow interpretation of the specific prohibitions that the
Framers intended the clause to protect against at the time
they wrote the Constitution, while functionalism applies the
Bill of Attainder Clause to new factual situations in light of
the perceived purpose in its constitutional framework).
15 See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 139.
16 See id.
17 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (Supp. 1997).
18 See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 139.
19 See id. at 226. The BOCs were 22 companies held
under seven Regional Bell Operating Companies ("RBOCs").
They consisted of NYNEX, Pacific Telesis, SBC Communica-
tions, U.S. West, Bell South, Ameritech, and Bell Atlantic. See
id. at 14043 & n.41. Note, there are presently only five
RBOCs since SBC Communications acquisition of Pacific Tel-
esis Group and Bell Atlantic's acquisition of NYNEX. See
Mike Mills, The Bells' Fastest Operator, WASH. POST, Jan. 6,
1998, at DI; Mike Mills, Bell Atlantic May Gain Long-Distance
Entree in N.Y., WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 1998, at H1.
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B. Overview of the Special Provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996
In an effort to replace the 1982 MFJ, Congress
enacted Sections 271-75 of the 1996 Act to pro-
mote competition and accordingly freed the
BOCs from the line-of-business restraints. 23 Con-
gress determined that in order to improve the na-
tional competitive marketplace, the BOCs should
be permitted to manufacture telephone equip-
ment, provide cable television connection, and
enter the coveted long-distance market. 24 Con-
gress engineered a plan for increased local tele-
phone competition that was designed to prevent
each BOC from blocking market entry into their
service regions. 25 This plan required the BOCs to
meet a checklist of fourteen safeguards in order
to be permitted to enter other telecommunica-
tions markets. 26 Next, the BOCs were required to
submit an application to the Federal Communica-
tions Commission ("FCC") certifying that they
had satisfied the checklist.
27
In order to be approved, the FCC requires an
applicant under Section 271 to meet four basic re-
quirements. First, the BOC must satisfy either the
requirements of Section 271(c) (1) (A) known as
23 See H.R. Rep. No. 102-850, at 7 (1992). The report
stated that, although at first the "line of business" restrictions
were necessary constraints, it was time to release the BOCs to
encourage entry into these lucrative markets. See id.
24 See id.
25 See generally Michael F. Finn, The Public Interest and Bell
Entry Into Long Distance Under Section 271 of the Communications
Act, 5 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 203, 209 (1997) [hereinafter
Finn] (discussing the BOC entry provisions under the FCC's
public interest review).
26 See 47 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2) (B) (Supp. 1997).
27 See 47 U.S.C. § 271 (Supp. 1997). In addition, a sepa-
rate application must be filed by the BOC in the state in
which it seeks approval to offer in-region long distance ser-
vice. See id. § 271(d).
28 See 47 U.S.C. § 271 (c) (1) (A) (Supp. 1997); In Re Ap-
plication of SBC Communications, Inc. et al. Pursuant to Sec-
tion 271 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to Provide
In-Region, InterLATA Services in the State of Oklahoma,
Evaluation of the United States Department of Justice, CC Docket
No. 97-121 (May 16, 1997) at 8.
.29 See 47 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1) (A) (Supp. 1997).
30 Telephone service can be offered over the competi-
tors' own facilities or over the competitors own facilities ac-
companied by the resale of service bought from another car-
rier. See 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1)(A) (Supp. 1997).
31 "[A] Bell operating company shall be considered not
to have received any request for access and interconnection
if the State commission of such State certifies that the only
provider or providers making such a request have (i) failed
to negotiate in good faith as required by Section 252 of this
tide, or (ii) violated the terms of an agreement approved
"Track A," or Section 271(c)(1)(B) known as
"Track B."28 "Track A" requires the BOC to enter
at least one interconnection agreement with a
competing local phone company also known as a
competitive local exchange carrier ("CLEC").29
The CLEC must provide service to business and
residential subscribers located in the same market
as the RBOC. 30 "Track B" allows a RBOC to sat-
isfy "Track A" if ten months after the 1996 Act was
enacted, no request had been made by any CLEC
for access or interconnection to the RBOCs' net-
work. 31 Second, the 1996 Act requires the BOCs
to establish that they have adequately fulfilled
fourteen competitive requirements governing the
access and information BOCs have provided to
CLECs.32 Generally, a BOC would satisfy the list if
it demonstrated that its network was open to entry
for CLECs.33 Third, if a BOC intends to provide
interLATA telecommunications services, it must
establish separate affiliates to provide such serv-
ices under Section 272. 3 4 Finally, the fourth re-
quirement mandates the FCC to grant the appli-
cation after formal review, if it concludes that
approval is consistent with "the public interest,
convenience, and necessity.
35
under Section 252 of this title by the provider's failure to
comply, within a reasonable period of time, with the imple-
mentation schedule contained in such agreement." 47
U.S.C. § 271(c)(1)(B) (Supp. 1997).
32 See 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3) (Supp. 1997).
33 Section 271 of the 1996 Act requires BOCs to allow
other telecommunications to interconnect with their existing
network before they can provide long distance service to cus-
tomers within their service region. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 271 (c)(1)(A) (Supp. 1997). See also Henry H. Bartlett, The
Public Interest and the Introduction of Competition into Local Tele-
phone Networks, 5 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 251 (1997) [herein-
after "Bartlett"] (debating the purpose and success of the in-
terconnection provisions of the 1996 Act).
34 See 47 U.S.C. § 272 (Supp. 1997). A BOC must estab-
lish separate affiliates for the following services: (1) manufac-
turing activities; (2) origination of interLATA telecommuni-
cations services; (3) interLATA information services
(excluding alarm monitoring and electronic publishing serv-
ices). Id. at §§ 272(a)(2)(A)-(C).
35 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3) (C) (Supp. 1997). See generally
Finn, supra note 25, at 209 (discussing the "public interest"
standard as commonly used tool by Congress to assist an
agency in implementing broad policy goals of a particular
legislative act); see also FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450
U.S. 582, 593 (1981) (citing FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309
U.S. 134, 138 (1940)) (finding the public interest standard
intended to be a tool of discretion in order to ensure an
agency may carry out the legislative task designated by Con-
gress); National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190




Section 273 provides that BOCs will not be per-
mitted to provide telecommunications equip-
ment, or manufacture such equipment if the
BOCs have not complied with Section 271(d).16
Section 274 prohibits a BOC from engaging in
electronic publishing through use of their local
phone service for four years.37 Finally, Section
275 forbids a BOC from entering alarm monitor-
ing services for five years. 38
Two years after President Clinton signed the
1996 Act into law, Senator Hollings' goal of creat-
ing order out of chaos has yet to be achieved.39
Once hailed as the most comprehensive commu-
nications legislation in 60 years, the 1996 Act has
failed to convert local exchange service from a
regulated monopoly to a competitive market-
place. 40 For example, at present there are ap-
proximately 100 CLECs in the nation. 4 t CLECs
have switches in only 132 cities and only $14 bil-
lion has been invested in the local telephone in-
dustry by the CLECs. 42 While these figures could
be construed as an impetus to competition, the
average consumer has yet to enjoy the fruits of the
36 "A [BOC] may manufacture and provide telecommu-
nications equipment, and manufacture customer premises
equipment, if the Commission authorizes that [BOC] or any
[BOC] affiliate to provide interLATA services under Section
271 (d) of this title, subject to the requirements of this section
and the regulations prescribed thereunder, except that
neither a [BOC] nor any of its affiliates may engage in such
manufacturing in conjunction with a [BOC] not so affiliated
or any of its affiliates." 47 U.S.C. § 273(a) (Supp. 1997).
37 See 47 U.S.C. § 274(a) (Supp. 1997). Electronic pub-
lishing includes "the dissemination, provision, publication,
or sale to an unaffiliated entity or persons, of any one or
more of the following: news (including sports); entertain-
ment (other than interactive games); business, financial,
legal, consumer, or credit materials; editorials, columns, or
features; advertising; photos or images; archival or research
material; legal notices or public records; scientific, educa-
tional, instructional, technical, professional, trade, or other
literary materials; or other like similar information." Id.
§ 274(h).
38 "No [BOC] or affiliate thereof shall engage in the pro-
vision of alarm monitoring services before the date which is 5
years after the date of enactment of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996." 47 U.S.C. § 275(a)(1) (Supp. 1997).. Note that
if a BOC or affiliate was engaged in the business of alarm
monitoring services as of Nov. 30, 1995, Section 275 does not
apply. Id. § 275(a) (2).
39 See Statement of Sen. Hollings, supra note 1 and ac-
companying text.
40 See President's Message, FCBA NEWSLETTER (Federal
Communications Bar Association, Wash., D.C.), Feb. 1998, at
2-3 [hereinafter President's Message]. Industry experts blame
local and federal battles as impeding local competition. Fur-
ther, critics as well as proponents of the 1996 Act claim entry
is too expensive. Further, industry experts claim other less
expensive mechanisms of local entry created by the 1996 Act
1996 Act. For instance, CLECs currently account
for only 2.6% of all national local telephone reve-
nues.43 Furthermore, residential phone service
still remains under the monopolistic blanket of
the incumbent local exchange carriers.
44
Additionally, two of the primary public policy
goals of the 1996 Act, universal service and inter-
connection, remain unfulfilled. 45 Universal ser-,
vice is the goal of providing all consumers with
basic telephone services through subsidization
from a fund to which all telecommunications
providers contribute. 46 Interconnection, the sub-
ject of Section 251, is the duty of a local exchange
carrier to provide other telecommunications car-
riers with the ability to interconnect with its facili-
ties and equipment.
47
Currently, the comprehensive approach to cost
allocations required for achieving universal ser-
vice cannot be implemented due to an ongoing
battle between Internet Service Providers and
ILECs. 48 More importantly, the FCC has been re-
strained by the Eighth Circuit decision, Iowa Utili-
ties Board v. FCC.49 of its authority to create and
are still to costly to attempt entry. See Salvatore Salamone,
Telecom Act Still Floundering, INTERNET WK., Feb. 23, 1998.
41 See Chairman William E. Kennard, Press Statement on
the Second Anniversary of the Telecom Act of 1996 Uan. 30,
1996) [hereinafter "Kennard"].
42 See id. The local phone industry grosses $100 billion
annually in revenues. See Andrew Kupfer, The Telecom Wars,
FORTUNE, Mar. 3, 1997, at 136 [hereinafter "Kupfer"].
43 See Kennard, supra note 41.
44 See id.
45 See President's Message, supra note 40.
46 See 47 U.S.C. § 254 (Supp. 1997). Universal Service is
a plan to provide low cost high quality telecommunications
services to all Americans through an even cost to service
providers. The 1996 Act expanded the definition of univer-
sal service to include: (1) all eligible telecommunications car-
riers, including wireless service providers may receive univer-
sal service subsidies; (2) eligible schools and libraries will
receive discount services for telecommunications services, In-
ternet access, and internal connections; and (3) discounts for
rural health care providers; discounts for low income con-
sumers. See id. at § 254(h); In re Implementation of the Uni-
versal Service Provision in the Telecommunications Act of
1996, Universal Service, First Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd.
8776 (1997).
47 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(a) (Supp. 1997); see generally In re
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order, 11 FCC
Rcd. 15499 (1996); see also Bartlett, supra note 33 (explaining
the implementation and debates regarding the interconnec-
tion provisions of the 1996 Act).
48 See generally Comments of Senators Burns and Stevens,
In re Federal State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report
to Congress, CC Dkt. No. 96-45 (Jan. 26, 1998).
49 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997).
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implement the complex interconnection regula-
tions required under the 1996 Act.50 Lastly, cable
rates have risen, despite Congress' confident pre-
dictions that they would drop.51
These failures have resulted in a torrent of criti-
cism from practitioners who argue that the 1996
Act has failed to achieve its goal of local competi-
tion.52 However, proponents of the 1996 Act
maintain that the field of telecommunications is
merely experiencing a state of regulatory evolu-
tion that will result in a more competitive mar-
ket.
53
II. AN OVERVIEW OF SBC
COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Sections 271-75 were struck down as unconstitu-
tional on New Year's Eve, 1997. 5 4 In SBC Commu-
nications v. FCC,55 the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District in Texas held that Sections 271-
75 of the 1996 Act constitute an unconstitutional
bill of attainder. 56 SBC, a RBOC, argued in its
summary judgment motion that the sections: (1)
amounted to an unconstitutional bill of attainder
that; (2) violated the doctrine of separation of
powers; (3) violated the equal protection clause;
and (4) violated the First Amendment.
57
50 See id. The court held that the FCC's statutory author-
ity delegated by Congress to implement Sections 251 and 252
of the 1996 Act was limited. Specifically, the court found that
the plain meaning was exceeded by the FCC's broad inter-
connection arrangement. First, the court found that the
FCC could not require the ILECs to charge CLECs certain
prices for interconnection rates and unbundled network ele-
ments. Second, the court invalidated the FCC's "pick and
choose" rule. Third, the court found that the ILECs did not
have to provide higher quality network elements, intercon-
nection arrangements, or access to CLECs. Finally, the court
held that the FCC could not require ILECs to offer bundled
network elements to CLECs. See id. In an effort to spur local
competition, Florida has drafted legislation that would in-
crease phone bills between 50 to 100 percent. See id. Legisla-
tors hope the increase will convince CLECs that it is profita-
ble to offer service within the state. See Mike Mills, Fla. Seeks
Higher Phone Rates to Expand Market, WASH. POST, Mar. 8,
1998, at A8.
51 See In Re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competi-
tion in Markets for the Delivery of Video Programming,
Fourth Annual Report, CS Dkt. No. 97-141 (Jan. 13, 1998)
(finding cable rates rose four times faster than the rate of
inflation in 1997).
52 See President's Message, supra note 40, at 2-3 (discussing
the debates at the 15th Annual Conference on Telecommu-
nications Policy and Regulation).
53 See id.
54 See SBC Communications, 981 F. Supp. at 1008.
The dispute arose from the specific identifica-
tion and categorization of BOCs in Sections 271-
75.
5
8 SBC charged that the legislation imposed
restrictions on only the BOCs' entry into various
telecommunications markets and not the entry of
other similarly situated carriers. 59 SBC contended
that the Bill of Attainder Clause of the U.S. Con-
stitution bars such extrajudicial punishment.
60
The FCC on the other hand, argued that Sections
271-75 were appropriate non-punitive legislation
which failed to constitute a bill of attainder.
61
In its analysis, the court acknowledged that the
Supreme Court had not yet decided whether Con-
gress may enact laws that single out a specific cor-
poration. 62 The court further acknowledged that
the Supreme Court rarely found a statute to be an
unconstitutional bill of attainder. 6 However, the
court noted that Sections 271-75 amount to un-
precedented legislative acts that require careful
constitutional scrutiny.64 The court stated that
legislation is an unconstitutional bill of attainder
when it: "(1) identifies a specific individual or
group (2) inflicts punishment on that individual
or group (3) without the benefit of a judicial
trial."65 The court acknowledged that the first
prong was easily satisfied because Section 271 spe-
cifically names the BOCs as the only entities
forced to fulfill the specific requirements. 66 The
55 Id. at 996.
56 See id. at 1008.
57 See id, (finding that that the sections were a bill of at-
tainder, the court did not address the equal protection argu-
ment nor the first amendment argument).
58 See SBC Communications, 981 F. Supp. at 1000.
59 See id. For example, the court stressed that while SBC
and other RBOCs' hands remain tied by the Special Provi-
sions, their competitors such as GTE to offer one stop shop-
ping to their customers (purchase of local and long distance
service through one carrier). See id. Further, the court also
noted that the RBOCs are prevented (unlike similarly situ-
ated carriers) from entering alarm monitoring and informa-
tion services. See id. at 1005.
60 -"No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed." U.S. CONST., ART. I, § 9, cl. 3.
61 See SBC Communications, 981 F. Supp. at 1002.
62 See id. at 1003. "[T]he Supreme Court has never ad-
dressed the precise issue before this court: whether Congress
may enact laws that single out by name specific business enti-
ties and restrict their ability to conduct lawful business, and
do not do so for other similarly situated entities." Id.
63 See id. at 1004.
64 See id. (finding that the statutes were extraordinary be-
cause Congress rarely declares someone guilty of an offense
and then decides how to remedy that offense).
65 Id. at 1004 (citing Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota
Public Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 846 (1984)).
66 See id.; 47 U.S.C. § 271 (Supp. 1997).
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court then addressed whether under prongs two
and three Sections 271-75 constitute extrajudicial
legislative punishment or were attempts at mere
economic regulation.
67
In determining whether these sections consti-
tute a bill of attainder, the court applied the
three-pronged analysis used by the Supreme
Court to decide whether a law acts as extra-judi-
cial punishment in violation of the Bill of Attain-
der Clause. 68 The first step involves a historical
analysis of whether the legislation resembles bur-
dens traditionally found to be legislative punish-
ment.69 SBC argued that Section 271's effect was
mirrored in Supreme Court precedent, which
hold as unconstitutional, laws barring individuals
or specific groups from engaging in particular
businesses.70 Specifically, the Special Provisions
prevent the BOCs from engaging in otherwise
lawful telecommunications businesses that are a
historically protected constitutional right.71 In re-
sponse, the FCC asserted that deprivation of em-
ployment differed from a mere restriction on a
particular entity in a certain line of business, a re-
striction to which the RBOCs have always been
subject.7 2 By extending the 1982 MFJ, the FCC ar-
gued, the regulation neither instituted new re-
strictions, nor set up permanent bars on the
BOCs' ability to enter a lawful business.7 3
The FCC further argued that Sections 271-75
were only a continuation of the existing restric-
tions adjudicated and administered by the 1982
MFJ, related court orders, and various administra-
tive regulations.7 4 That is, the 1996 Act alters the
framework previously created by the courts.75 It
67 See SBC Communications, 981 F. Supp. at 1004.
68 See id.
69 See id. (citing Nixon v. Administrator of General Serv-
ices, 433 U.S. 425, 475 (1977)).
70 See id.; but see Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947).
71 See SBC Communications, 981 F. Supp. at 1005.
72 See Defendants' Memorandum in Support of their
Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment and in Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 6, SBC Commu-
nications, Inc. v. FCC, 981 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Tex. 1997)
[hereinafter Defendants' Memorandum].
73 See id.
74 See id. at 8.
75 See id. at 6.
76 See Defendants Memorandum, supra note 72, at 6.
77 See id.
78 See SBC Communications, 981 F. Supp. at 1003 n.4. "It is
well settled that corporations are subject to criminal
law... Given that a bill of attainder is trial by legislature, with
penal consequences, the Court can think of no reason why
temporarily places the same restrictions in the
hands of Congress.7 Therefore, the FCC argued,
Congress and the FCC acted well within their
legal boundaries in extending the restrictions.
77
The District Court disregarded the Supreme
Court's neglect to afford corporations protection
under the Bill of Attainder Clause.7 Applying a
broad functional analysis, the court concluded
that, because the bill of attainder provision pro-
tects groups and not just individuals, it should be
expanded to include corporations.
7 9
The court noted that the constitutional protec-
tions against deprivation of rights are not only ap-
plied to life, liberty and property, but also to basic
civil and political liberties previously enjoyed by
an individual or group.80 Further, the District'
Court held that the bill of attainder provision can
include new forms of burdens and deprivations
not traditionally associated with past bill of attain-
der analyses. 8'
In addition, the court found that the essence of
the sections was to punish the BOCs for the anti-
trust sins of their "former parent, AT&T."82 The
court held impermissible such legislation that pre-
vents individuals or groups from engaging in a
profession, or deprives rights previously en-
joyed.8 3 Further, the court found the checklist re-
quirements imposed on the BOCs could not be
easily fulfilled.8 4 The Court labeled Section 271
an "onerous" mechanism designed to prevent the
BOCs from entering the lucrative long distance
industry when other local service providers not af-
filiated with the BOCs are allowed to do so.8 5 The
court found that a significant burden existed on
the clause should be read so narrowly to exclude corpora-
tions." Id..
79 See id. (citing Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277
(1866)); see also United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965)
(noting that bills of attainder traditionally apply only to
groups found guilty of treasonous activities).
80 See SBC Communications, 981 F. Supp. at 1004 (citing
Cummings, 71 U.S. at 320).
81 See id. (citing Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475). Added to the list
of traditional rights protected by the Bill of Attainder Clause,
the court noted it has been extended to protect prohibition
of an individual from employment. See id.
82 See id. at 1006.
83 See id. at 1007.
84 See id.
85 See id.; but cf Mike Mills, The Bells'Fastest Operator, SBC's
$5.8 Billion Offer for Conn. Phone Company Reflects the Aggressive-
ness of CEO Whiteacre, WASH. PosT, Jan. 6, 1998, at D1. SBC
has failed to exemplify the impediments into the telecommu-
nications marketplace cited by Judge Kendall. See id. In fact,
it is one of the fastest growing phone companies. See id. For
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SBC in comparison to other ILECs that are able to
provide "one-stop shopping" to their consum-
ers.86
The court determined that Congress en-
croached upon the judiciary's authority to deter-
mine compliance with the 1982 MFJ.8 7 Further, it
unlawfully instituted punishment for non-compli-
ance that had yet to be judicially determined. 88
The doctrine of separation of powers, the court
held, allows only the judiciary to adjudicate such
rights and liabilities.89
The court also addressed the FCC argument
that the sections could not be punitive because
they were not permanent.90 Under Section 271,
once a BOC is found by the FCC to have complied
with the checklist, it will be allowed to participate
in the in-region interexchange market.91 The
court rejected this argument by relying on prior
case law that has held an escape clause is not a
necessary factor in determining whether a bill of
attainder exists.
92
The court next applied a functional analysis
that required "analyzing whether the law under
challenge, viewed in terms of the type and severity
of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to fur-
ther non-punitive legislative purposes."93  The
court rejected the FCC argument that the sections
instance, SBC Communications within 21 months has bought
out another BOC, held merger talks with AT&T, and offered
to purchase the long distance provider Southern New Eng-
land Telephone. See id. '
86 See SBC Communications, 981 F. Supp. at 1007. One
stop shopping allows the consumer to receive both their local
telephone service and long distance service from one tele-
communications provider under one bill. See id.; see, e.g., Sa-
muel F. Cullari, Divestiture I: Is the Local Loop Ripe for Competi-
tion?, 3 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 175, 181 (1995) [hereinafter
"Cullari"].
87 See SBC Communications, 981 F. Supp. at 1006.
88 See id. at 1007. The court determined that any future
anti-competitive activity of the BOCs was properly addressed
by the nation's antitrust laws. See id. Congress cannot predict
an antitrust violation, and therefore the court held that the
271 checklist was a premature statement of the BOCs' guilt.
See id.
89 See id.
90 See id. at 1006.
91 See SBC Communications, 981 F. Supp. at 1006.
92 See id. The court relied heavily upon Selective Service
Sys. v. Minnesota Public interest Research Group., 468 U.S.
841 (1984). Distinguishing SBC Communications, the court
found no affirmative restraints existed in the latter. See id.
However, in the present case, the fourteen duties required
under the 271 checklist were not only affirmative duties but
onerous and arbitrary. See id.
93 Id. at 1007 (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475).
94 See id. The FCC stressed that Congress developed the
were intended to foster competition.9 4 Finding
quite the opposite, the court concluded that the
1996 Act establishes competition through Section
251 which requires interconnection arrangements
between all ILECs to promote competition. 95 The
court reasoned that the sections could only be in-
terpreted as a legislative determination of the
BOCs criminal intent, and therefore constitute
unconstitutional retroactive punishment.96 In the
final part of its functional analysis, the court re-
jected the FCC's contention that the legislative
history established a non-punitive purpose. 97 At
present, Judge Kendall has stayed his decision re-
garding the Special Provisions pending appeal to
the Fifth Circuit.9 8
If the SBC Communications decision stands, it
would be a fatal blow the Special Provisions of the
1996 Act. The Special Provisions were engineered
by Congress to offer a carrot to the BOCs in.re-
turn for allowing competition into their mar-
kets.9 9
The implications emerging from SBC Communi-
cations are numerous. First, Congress' plan to
open local phone markets to competition in re-
turn for allowing the BOCs to enter the long dis-
tance market will fail if the BOCs are freed of the
constraints imposed by the Special Provisions."'
checklist based on a "realistic appraisal of the incentives and
ability of a regulated monopolist that controls facilities on
which its competitors depend (the local networks) to disad-
vantage such competitors and thereby impede competition."
Defendants' Memorandum supra note 72, at 8.
9 See SBC Communications, 981 F. Supp. at 1007 (assert-
ing that competition could not be the Congressional goal of
271 because Congress already promoted competition
through Section 251 which required all ILECs to allow
CLECs to interconnect to their network).
96 See id.
97 See id. The court determined that increased local com-
petition was already addressed in other parts of the 1996 Act.
See id. Consequently, the court could not infer any purpose
other than "preventing anticompetitive activities" for the en-
actment of Section 271. Id. The court found that such a pur-
pose clearly was punitive. See id. at 1008.
98 See Seth Schiesel, U.S. Judge Stays His Ruling on Long-
Distance Service, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1998, at D2; see alsoJoint
Brief of Petitioner BellSouth Corp. and Intervenor U.S. West,
Inc. at 1, BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, No. 97-1113 (D.C. Cir. filed
Feb. 28, 1997) (presently the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia is considering whether the bill of
attainder argument applies to the BOCs entry into the elec-
tronic publishing industry).
99 See H.R. Rep. 102-850, 7 (Aug. 12 1992). "H.R. 5096
would codify a mechanism to encourage entry by the Bell op-
erating companies into these restricted markets as soon as
antitrust considerations permit." Id.
100 See generally Mike Mills, Ruling Would Let Bells Into
1998]
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
Second, the BOCs who control the majority of ur-
ban markets could offer consumers one stop
shopping through single billing for local and long
distance service. "" This would put other long dis-
tance providers (e.g., AT&T, MCI, and Sprint) at a
competitive disadvantage. 0 2 Further,, without lo-
cal competition, BOCs could squeeze out long dis-
tance providers, such as MCI or AT&T, by using
creative cost mechanisms to institute higher ac-
cess charges on other companies for connection
to their networks.10 3 Finally, without incentive to
enter the local market, CLECs will have no choice
but to merge with the superior situated ILECs re-
sulting in creation of "mega-phone companies"
that will control the marketplace. 10 4 Such serious
ramifications require a detailed analysis of the
constitutionality of a Congressional bar against
one local telecommunications company from a
market, while not holding similar telecommunica-
Long-Distance, WASH-. PosT, Jan. 1, 1998 at Al. Also, other
BOCs have seized on the recent attack of the Special Provi-
sions to enter the long distance data communications indus-
try. See id. For example, U.S. West Communications and the
Bell-Atlantic Corporation recently announced a plan to build
a national data network where they could serve their local
service regions. See id. Such service is also banned by the Spe-
cial Provisions. See id. Their respective applications are await-
ing review by the FCC which must determine whether it falls
into an exception of the Special Provision intended to en-
courage new technological developments. See id.; but cf. Rob-
ert H. Bork, Laurence Tribe and the Crybaby Bells, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 22, 1997, at A22 [hereinafter "Bork"]. Mr. Bork
predicts that if the Special Provisions are found unconstitu-
tional, the line of business restraints imposed by the 1982
MFJ will still remain intact. See id. Therefore, the BOCs may
find themselves once again completely barred from the long
distance industry if 5th Circuit overturns the decision. See id.
101 One stop shopping allows the consumer to receive
under one bill both local and long distance service from one
telecommunications provider under one bill. See Cullari,
supra note 86.
102 See In re Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, First Report
and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15505 (1996). The incumbent LEC
through control of the network can discourage a CLEC's en-
try in two ways: (1) it may choose not to interconnect the
CLEC; and (2) it may use its superior position to charge
higher prices for terminating calls from the CLEC's custom-
ers. See id.
103 See id.
104 Without ensured competition, Chairman Kennard
warned that, "[1hong distance companies will have no alterna-
tives but to merge with an ILEC .... The Bells tell every-
body-especially you in the investment community-that
consumers want 'one-stop-shopping.' If you believe that, then
the result would be mergers and consolidation." Chairman
Kennard Warns that Premature Bell Enty Into Long Distance Will
Create Megamergers Not Competition, FCC NEWS, Mar. 13, 1998.
105 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 271-75 (Supp. 1997).
106 See Jane Welsh, The Bill of Attainder Clause: An Unquali-
tions companies to the same restrictions. 0 5
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BILL OF
ATTAINDER JURISPRUDENCE
Historically, bills of attainder were commonly
used against political groups that the English Par-
liament found treasonous.1 0 6 Parliament adjudi-
cated such treasonous activities punishable by
death. 0 7 In drafting the Constitution, the Fram-
ers intended the Bill of Attainder Clause to have a
narrow meaning.10 8 They defined a bill of attain-
der as an act of the legislature that sentenced a
person to death and prevented his heirs from in-
heriting property. 0 9 In this regard, the Framers
stressed the necessity and importance of the bill
of attainder as a constitutional guard against legis-
lative encroachment on the judiciary.1 10
Through a series of decisions over the past two
fled Guarantee of Process, 50 BROOK. L. REv. 77, 83 (1983)
[hereinafter Welsh]. Bills of attainder were deemed a cor-
ruption of blood on the family resulting in the designee be-
ing treated as if he had never been born. See id.; see also
ZECHARIAH CHAFFEEJR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF 1787, 96 (1956).
107 See Welsh, supra note 106, at 83. The lesser strict
form of a bill of attainder also employed by parliament were
known as bills of pains and penalties. Such bills were puni-
tive but did not result in a death sentence. See id. at 84. The
English definition of the bill of attainder was "deprivation di-
rected against a specific person or group of persons after a
legislative determination of guilt for conduct that may or may
not have been criminal when undertaken." Id.
108 See Thomas B. Griffith, Beyond Process: A Substantive
Rationale for the Bill of Attainder Clause, 70 VA. L. REV. 475, 496
(1984) [hereinafter "Griffith"] (providing an extensive dis-
cussion of the historic interpretation of the Bill of Attainder
Clause).
109 See id.
1 10 Alexander Hamilton's sense of importance of Bill of
Attainder Clause appears in his experience in defending the
rights of a Loyalist during the British military occupation of
New York City. See RIc-IARD B. MORRIS, ALEXANDER HAMIL
TON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE NATION 450 (1957). Hamil-
ton wrote, "...no man can forfeit, or be justly deprived, with-
out his consent, or any right to which as a member of the
community, he is entitled, but for some crime incurring for-
feiture," and that "no man ought to be condemned unheard,
or punished for supposed offences, without having an oppor-
tunity of making his defence." Id. James Madison shared
Hamilton's sense of importance of forbidding Congress to
enact laws of bills of attainder to protect the personal rights
of citizens. See id. In the Federalist, no. 44, Madison wrote
that "bills of attainder, ex-post-facto laws, and laws impairing
the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles
of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legisla-
tion.. .Very properly, therefore, have the convention added
this constitutional bulwark in favor of personal security and
private rights..." THE FEDERALIST No. 44 Uames Madison).
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hundred years, the Supreme Court's bill of attain-
der analysis has evolved from the Framers' narrow
historic interpretation to a functional analysis that
still respects the Framers' intent."' For instance,
beginning as early as 1810 in Fletcher v. Peck, the
Court merged a less strict form of the bill of at-
tainder, bills of pains and penalties (legislative
punishment that did not result in death) into its
bill of attainder definition.' 12 Justice Marshall
wrote in Fletcher that state legislatures could not
pass ex post facto laws which forfeit the estate of the
purchaser for crimes committed by the seller.
1 3
The Court's inclusion of bill of pains and penal-
ties into the bill of attainder definition demon-
strated its functional interpretation of the Consti-
tution.' 
14
Bill of attainder jurisprudence lay dormant for
more than fifty years until the Court's 1866 deci-
sion in Cummings v. Missouri.115  Cummings in-
volved an action brought by a priest challenging
the constitutionality of post Civil War Amend-
ments to the Missouri Constitution.1 6  The
Amendments provided that a person holding an
office of trust must take an oath where he denies
ever acting in a sympathetic manner for the Rebel
cause.' 1 7 Failure to take the oath resulted in im-
mediate imprisonment. 18 Expanding its func-
111 See Griffith, supra note 108, at 477 (discussing the
continued debate regarding whether the Bill of Attainder
Clause should be defined as protecting the formal character-
istics associated with its creation or the future evils that "the
common-law forms represented").
112 See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 138 (1810); see also
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (asking if a bill of
attainder is passed, should the court condemn to death per-
sons the Constitution seeks to preserve); Griffith, supra note
108, at 479.
113 See Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 139.
114 See id. at 138. Justice Marshall also wrote, "[a] bill of
attainder may affect the life of an individual, or may confis-
cate his property or both." Id. (recognizing that "the power
of the legislature over lives and fortunes of individuals is re-
strained"). Griffith, supra note 108, at 479.
115 71 U.S. 277 (1866); see also Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S.
333 (1866). A companion case striking down a federal statute
which required attorneys who wished to practice in federal
court to submit a loyalty oath. See id. at 335. The attorneys
were required to swear that they had not participated in the
Confederate rebellion. See id.; see also Welsh, supra note 106,
at 90-93 (discussing the broadened interpretation of the Bill
of Attainder Clause by the Supreme Court).
116 See 71 U.S. at 282.
117 See id. at 281.
118 See id.
119 See id. at 287. The Court noted that punishment is
infliction of "pain or privation." Id. The Court then decided
that deprivation of privilege is punishment. See id. It defined
tional analysis, the Court reasoned that the
Amendments did in fact constituted a bill of at-
tainder. 119  It based its determination on a
number of inferences. 120 First, the Court deter-
mined thAt the power to inflict punishment rests
with the judiciary. 1 2 1 Second, the Court deter-
mined thal Congress may pass retroactive laws
which deprive citizens of everything except life,
liberty, and cumulation of wealth. 122 The Court
also noted that punishment is measured by the ef-
fect on the citizens, not by legislative intent
alone. 12 3 Third, the Court expanded the bill of
attainder definition to apply to a whole class and
not just to specific individuals.
1 24
The functional analysis of Cummings ran into
difficulty in Hawker v. New York' 25 and Dent v. West
Virginia.126 Both cases involved the qualifications
to practice medicine. 127 In Hawker, the Court
found a statute constitutional that prohibited for-
mer convicts from practicing medicine. 12  In
Dent, the Court upheld a state's right to forbid
non-graduates of medical schools from practicing
medicine. 129 The shift of the Court's jurispru-
dence required it to resolve its contradictory hold-
ing in Cummings.130 It accomplished this by apply-
ing what appeared to be the rational basis test. 13
The court determined that, as Hawker and Dent
privileges as an individual's right to life, liberty, and prop-
erty. See id.
120 See id. The majority's functional view was accompa-
nied by fervent dissent lead by Justice Miller based on the
historicism analysis. See id. Justice Miller argued that the his-
torical interpretations were limited to the common law defi-
nition: corruption of blood or conviction or sentence of a
named person. See id. Therefore, the Amendments did not
satisfy the Court's bill of attainder test. See id.
121 See Cummings, 71 U.S. at 286.
122 See id. at 286.
123 See id. at 321-22.
124 See id. at 323 (noting that bills of attainder could
either identify an individual or target an entire class).
125 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
126 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
127 See Hawker, 170 U.S. at 191; Dent, 129 U.S. at 122.
128 See Hawker, 170 U.S. at 199-200.
129 See Dent, 129 U.S. at 128.
130 See Cummings, 71 U.S. at 281. The Hawker Court dis-
tinguished Cummings because in Hawker, there was a direct
link between the patient and his trust in the practitioner of
medicine. See id. Such a legislative goal, held the Court,
must receive greater weight than the general prohibition
against employment outlined in Cummings. See Hawker, 170
U.S. at 198. The Court's analysis exemplifies the weight a
valid governmental purpose is given in drafting legislation
that may be subject to bill of attainder scrutiny. See id.
131 See Dent, 129 U.S. at 125; Hawker, 170 U.S. at 198-99;
see also Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996) (stating
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were rationally related to a legitimate state end -
the fitness to be a doctor - Cummings failed to
offer any similar objective. 132 However, in order
to avoid having to strike down the popular regula-
tions, the Court was forced to cast aside the
broadened principles under functi6nalism laid
out in Cummings. 133 As a result, Hawker and Dent
marked the beginning of the Court's application
of inconsistent bill of attainder tests.
It was not until 1946 that the Court labeled an-
other statute an unconstitutional bill of attainder.
In United States v. Lovett,' 3 4 a legislative act ex-
cluded three individuals from receiving compen-
sation for their employment because they were
found to be subversive. 13 5 In an attempt to re-
solve its failure to structure an effective functional
bill of attainder analysis in earlier cases, Justice
Black identified three elements that reviewing
courts should consider to determine whether leg-
islation amounted to a bill of attainder.1 36 First,
did the act specify a certain group of persons?
137
Second, did the act impose punishment on the
designated persons? 3s Third, did it impose pun-
ishment without the benefit of a judicial trial?' 39
The Court applied the standard Justice Black laid
that the court will uphold the legislative classification so long
as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end).
132 See Dent, 129 U.S. at 125.
1'3 See Griffith, supra note 108, at 482 (noting that
Hawker and Dent represent an early example of the Court's
difficult task in balancing liberties that the Bill of Attainder
Clause seeks to protect against politically neutral legislation).
1'4 328 U.S. 303 (1946). Lovett involved the Emergency
Relief Appropriations Act of 1941. See id. Congress was con-
cerned that during the late thirties, numerous governmental
subversives were occupying influential federal positions. See
id. Labeled as "crackpot, radical bureaucrats and affiliates of
communist front organizations," the petitioners were
targeted and denied pay for their government employment.
Id. Further, at a hearing to determine how serious a threat to
government the named individuals posed, the alleged subver-
sives were not allowed to have their attorneys present. See id.
at 304-05.
3 5 See id. at 304-05; see also Griffith, supra note 108, at
483-84 (discussing the Lovett Court's jurisprudence at
length).
1361 See id. at 316.
137 See id.
138 See id.
139) See id. (citing the numerous constitutional proce-
dural safeguards the accused is awarded at trial such as the
right to a jury, representation by counsel, and confrontation
of witnesses).
140 See id. at 317; see also Griffith, supra note 108, at 483-
84 (interpreting the Lovett bill of attainder test as requiring
specific exclusion from employment due to Congressional
fact finding).
141 See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 318.
out and held that a legislature's specific exclusion
of a group from government service on grounds
of subversion constituted specificity and punish-
ment without a judicial hearing.1 40 Notably, the
more significant section of the Lovett decision was
Justice Frankfurter's concurrence because it
called for an even narrower reading of the Bill of
Attainder Clause based on its historical applica-
tion. 14' Justice Frankfurter interpreted the Bill of
Attainder Clause as having a narrow and distinct
historical meaning. 142 He also wrote that an es-
sential part of the bill of attainder analysis is an
explicit declaration of guilt by the legislature.
143
Justice Frankfurter's insightful analysis prevailed
as the preferred approach to bill of attainder anal-
ysis for the next twenty years.1 4 4 The Supreme
Court found his bill of attainder jurisprudence
particularly useful in the McCarthy era.
145
In United States v. Brown, the Court. refined its
functional bill of attainder analysis when it shifted
its scrutiny from non traditional punishments to
specificity. 146 Brown involved a Congressional stat-
ute that prohibited anyone who had been a mem-
ber of the Communist Party to serve as an officer
in a labor union. 47 The Court found that since
142 See id at 321-22. "The prohibition against bills of at-
tainder must be viewed in the background of the historic situ-
ation when moves in specific legislation that are now the con-
ventional and, for the most part, the exclusive concern of
courts were commonplace legislative practices." Id. at 322; see
also Griffith, supra note 108, at 484 (discussing Justice Frank-
furters historical approach to the bill of attainder analysis).
143 See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 323.
144 See David P. Restaino, Conditioning Financial Aid on
Draft Registration: A Bill of Attainder Analysis, 84 COLUM. L.
REv. 775, 779 (1984) [hereinafter Restaino]; Griffith, supra
note 108, at 484. Justice Frankfurter found there are two
types of constitutional claims. See id. Certain claims are
awarded broad standards such as equal protection. See id.
However, there are clauses which derive from specific provi-
sions that are limited. See id. These provisions were too nar-
row to afford any continued judicial enforcement. See id. The
bill of attainder is such a provision. See Lovett, 328 U.S. at
321.
145 See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 87-88 (1961) (finding a statute that required
Communist party members to register with the Justice De-
partment did not constitute a bill of attainder because it
lacked specificity. The Court determined the party members
could "escape" the regulation my merely altering their behav-
ior); see American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382, 413 (1950) (finding a statute that denied persons who
would not attest to belonging to anarchist groups was a rea-
sonable legislative purpose for qualifications to serve as a
public employee).
146 See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 461-62
(1965); see Griffith, supra note 108, at 486.
147 See Brown, 381 U.S. at 438 n.1.
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the statute specifically designated Communist
Party members and permanently denied those
members employment opportunities for their
political affiliation, the statute constituted a bill of
attainder.1 48 The Court traced the detailed his-
tory of bill of attainder jurisprudence and ulti-
,mately found that the Bill of Attainder Clause was
also an important ingredient of the doctrine of
separation of powers.1 49  The Court held that
while the legislature may depict general charac-
teristics of the parties subject to a piece of legisla-
tion when enacting a piece of legislation, it can-
not single out specific individuals, as it did in the
case of Communist party members.1
50
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, the
Court once again developed a new approach to
bill of attainder analysis. 51 Nixon involved the
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preserva-
tion Act ("Recordings Act") 152 that permitted the
Administrator of General Services to obtain tape
recordings of all the former presidents. 153
The Court applied a two part analysis: (1)
whether the Recordings Act specified the former
President, and (2) whether the Act represented
legislative punishment. 154 The Court found a bill
of attainder did not exist. 15 5 First, the Court
stressed that the specificity clause, while an impor-
tant guard against tyranny, does not limit the leg-
islature's ability to impose adverse restrictions on
certain individuals or groups.' 56 Moreover, the
Court found that the naming of President Nixon
in the Recordings Act, amounted to a legitimate
class of one.157 Further, Congress possessed a suf-
148 See id. at 442.
149 See id. at 442-43. The Court concluded that the Bill of
Attainder Clause was written by the Framers to prevent the
legislature from acting as the judge and jury in determining
the*blameworthiness of specific individuals. See id. at 445.
150 See id. at 445.
151 See Nixon, 433 U.S. 425. See also Restaino, supra note
144, at 789 (arguing that burden constitutes punishment).
152 See 47 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 1997).
153 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 425. The Administrator of Gen-
eral Services was also authorized to obtain these materials
from any federal employee in possession of such recordings.
* Seeid.
154 See id. at 473-74.
155 See id. at 484.
156 See id. at 471.
157 See id. at 472. The fact that President Nixon was the
only individual named in the Recordings Act did not justify
the specificity prong of bill of attainder analysis because the
Recordings Act was targeted at future presidents as well. See
id. Specifically, the Court accepted the status of past presi-
dential papers that were already archived, as well as the Re-
cording Act's assurance that future presidents' records would
ficient purpose in singling out President Nixon in
the future preservation of important presidential
records.'
58
Second, the Court determined that even if the
specificity prong was satisfied, the Recordings Act
still did not constitute forbidden legislative pun-
ishment under prong two.' 59 In order to qualify
as a bill of attainder, legislative punishment had
to be punitive in nature. 60 The Court created a
three part analysis in order to evaluate whether
legislation was punitive. '61 The test required a de-
termination of whether: (1) the Recordings Act's
burden was similar to historical bills of attainder,
(2) the Recordings Act furthered non-punitive
legislative purposes, and (3) the legislative history
of the Recordings Act indicated a Congressional
intent to punish. 1
6 2
First, the Court found the Recordings Act's bur-
den fell well outside the historically severe bills of
attainder feared by the Framers.' 63 After rigorous
scrutiny of the both the Recordings Act and its
legislative history, the Court found that the Act
was non-punitive and Congress did not intend to
punish the President.1 64 The non-punitive goals
were designed to ensure the availability of the pa-
pers as evidence for a possible criminal hearing or
to preserve the historically valuable papers, were a
legitimate Congressional purpose.
165
The last time the Supreme Court addressed a
bill of attainder argument was in Selective Service
System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group
66
in 1984. Selective Service involved a student's quali-
fications to receive financial aid under the De-
be preserved. See id. Nixon was named because at the time
the Recordings Act was written, President Nixon's papers
were the only materials in jeopardy. See id.
158 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472. The Court found that
since all past Presidential materials were housed in presiden-
tial libraries, it was a reasonable legislative purpose to ensure
preservation of President Nixon's papers. Id.
159 See id. at 472-73.
160 See id. at 473.
161 See id. at 473-76.
162 See id. at 473-76. While also applying a historical anal-
ysis, the Court noted that a functional test is necessary to de-
termine whether the law "under challenge, viewed in terms
of the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can
be said to further non-punitive legislative purposes." Id.
"Where such legitimate purposes do not appear, it is reason-
able to conclude that punishment of individuals disadvan-
taged by the enactment was the purpose of the decision mak-
ers." Id.
163 See id. at 473-75.
164 See id. at 477-78.
165 See id. at 476-77.
166 See Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 841.
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fense Authorization Act of 1983 ("Defense
Act"). 167 The Defense Act required men to attest
that they had registered for the draft in order to
be eligible for financial aid. 168 Failure to file the
required statement with their school resulted in
denial of all federally supported financial aid ben-
efits to the student.169 Initially, the District Court,
after applying the Nixon analysis, determined that
the identification of an ascertainable group, po-
tential male students, violated the first prong of
the bill of attainder test. 170 Second, the court
found that by possible denial of federal aid, the
Defense Act constituted legislative punishment
under the second prong of the bill of attainder
analysis.171
Once again, the Supreme Court had to recon-
cile the conflicting tests established in its prior de-
cisions. 172 In yet another attempt to develop a
comprehensive bill of attainder standard, the
Court applied a functional analysis.' 73 However,
it softened the review by supplementing it with a
historical approach.
1 7 4
Addressing the specificity prong, the Court em-
ployed a historical analysis to determine whether
a specific group or individual was named.175 In
doing so, the Court considered the structure of
the Defense Act, as well as its legislative history.
176
Hesitant to alter a Congressional mandate, the
Court stated that the purpose of the 'judicial
function is 'not to destroy the Act if we can, but to
construe it, if consistent with the will of Congress,
167 See id. at 844.
168 See id.
169 See id.
170 See id. at 845-46. The lower court determined that the
statute clearly singled out students who filed late registrants
as the only individuals subject to the Defense Act. See id. The
court concluded this satisfied the specificity requirement of
bill of attainder analysis because the Defense Act targeted
students due to their past conduct. See id.
171 See Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 846. The punishment
requirement was satisfied because the court equated the pur-
suit of education to the pursuit of a vocation. See id. By de-
priving students of this right, the court concluded the stu-
dents were punished. See id.
172 See id. at 850-51. The court distinguished its Cum-
mings and Garland decisions because those two cases involved
absolute entry barriers into a profession because the individ-
uals named could not file loyalty oaths. See id. The individu-
als named were completely barred from seeking a vocation
due to their past affiliations. See id. However, the Court de-
termined that in Selective Serv., the Defense Act could not be
construed as an absolute barrier because the students were
allowed to erase their past conduct through draft registra-
tion. See id.
173 See id. at 851-53.
so as to comport with constitutional limita-
tions.' "1 77 The Court was able to distinguish Cum-
mings and Garland because they involved absolute
barriers to the entry of individuals into certain
professions due to their past affiliations.1 78 By
contrast, in Selective Service there was no such abso-
lute barrier because non-registrants received the
benefit of an escape clause.179 Therefore, by com-
plying with the registration requirement, a non-
registrant could eliminate the statutory barrier to
financial aid. 1"'
Next, the Court turned to the second prong of
the test to determine whether denial of financial
aid to non-registrants constituted legislative pun-
ishment.'8 The Court found the Defense Act
failed in this respect.'8 2 The Court emphasized
that each bill of attainder case requires unique
consideration. 8 3 Therefore, in order to deter-
mine whether a legislative act was punishment,
the Court applied the three-step inquiry of its ear-
lier Nixon decision: (1) whether the challenged
act fits the historical meaning of legislative pun-
ishment, (2) whether the burdens imposed by the
act can reasonably be said to further "nonpunitive
legislative purposes", and (3) whether the legisla-
tive history of the act indicates a congressional in-
tent to punish.
8 4
Applying the first prong's historical test, the
Court distinguished the Defense Act from its past
decisions in which it found legislation contained
174 See id. The Court limited the scope of deprivations
that may constitute punishment. See id. Specifically, the
Court noted that every burden on a citizen by the legislature
cannot be interpreted as punishment. See id. Therefore,
while the definition of punishment in the bill of attainder
context has slightly expanded, it was never expanded to in-
clude deprivations beyond those traditionally associated with
the Bill of Attainder Clause. See id. (citing Flemming v. Nes-
tor, 363 U.S. 603, 606 (1960); Nixon, 433 U.S. at 470; Lovett,
328 U.S. at 324). The Court's new two-pronged analysis in-
quired whether the statute in question: (1) specified a spe-
cific group or individual; and (2) constituted legislative pun-
ishment. See id.
175 See Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 849-51.
176 See id. at 848-50.
177 Id. at 850 (quoting CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548, 571 (1973)).
178 See id. at 850-51. Cf. Cummings, 71 U.S. at 281; Ex
Parte Garland, 71 U.S. at 333.
179 See Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 851.
180 See Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 851.
181 See id.
182 See id.
183 See id. at 852.
184 Id. at 852.
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impermissible punishment.1 85  Specifically, the
Court found that the non-contractual benefit as-
sociated in Selective Service was significantly differ-
ent from historical punishments, such as impris-
onment, which the Framers sought to prohibit.
86
The Court further held that non-contractual ben-
efits could not be equated with affirmative disabil-
ities, such as imprisonment, that had traditionally
been associated with punishment. 187 Moreover,
the escape clause of the Defense Act allowed the
non-registrants to control their destiny unlike the
permanent legislative barriers that existed in the
legislation considered in the Cummings and Gar-
land cases.' 8 8 Therefore, the Court found that the
Defense Act did not fit the historical meaning of
"legislative punishment" under the first prong.189
Second, the Court set out to determine whether
the statute furthered non-punitive goals or an in-
tent to punish.'90 Focusing on the legislative his-
tory of the Defense Act, the Court held that the
purpose of Congress was to encourage non-regis-
trants to register for the draft.' 9 ' The Court
found that draft registration was a worthwhile ob-
jective that fell well within the ambit of a non-pu-
nitive legislative goal.192
Consequently, the Selective Service Court held
that the Defense Act neither singled out a specific
group nor inflicted punishment.193 The Court
first applied a functional analysis declaring that
each bill of attainder case is unique, but then ap-





190 See Selective Sew., 468 U.S. at 854.
191 See id. (finding that Congress based its passage of the
statute based on the fact that at the time more than half a
.million men failed to register for the draft).
192 See id. at 855-56.
193 See id. at 856.
194 See id. at 851-53.
195 See Harvey Berkman, Is the Telcom Law 'Punishment'for
the Bells?, NAT'L. L. J. at Al (Jan. 26, 1998).
196 Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Lovett illustrates
this division of constitutional protections into two categories.
His jurisprudence should be quoted at length:
Broadly speaking, two types of constitutional claims
come before this Court. Most constitutional issues de-
rive from the broad standards of fairness written into the
Constitution (e.g., 'due process,' 'equal protection of the
laws,' 'just compensation'), and the division of power as
between the States and Nation. Such questions, by their
very nature, allow a relatively wide play for individual
legal judgment. The other class gives no such scope.
For this second class of constitutional issues derives from
peared to soften its analysis with a historical
twist.
19 4
IV. BILL OF ATTAINDER - DISSECTIONS:
ANALYZING THE DISTRICT COURT'S
FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
A. Overview
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has afforded
bill of attainder protection to politically unpopu-
lar groups or individual citizens targeted for ex-
clusion from government service.' 95 Portions of
the Framers' intent embodied within the Consti-
tution have been preserved over the past 200
years under functionalism.19 6  Certain clauses,
however, are still read in a narrow light that re-
spects the Framers' original intent. 97 The Bill of
Attainder Clause falls into this strict formalist cate-
gory.198 Accordingly, the Court has held five leg-
islative acts to be unconstitutional bills of attain-
der over the past two hundred years.' 99 Further,
each of these cases involved legislative acts during
two anxious periods in American history, namely
the Civil War and the Cold War.200 In all other
cases, however, the Court has been hesitant to
find legislation to be unconstitutional under
either its functional or formal approach to the
Bill of Attainder Clause.
201
very specific provisions of the Constitution. These had
their source in definite grievances and led the fathers to
proscribe against recurrence of their experience. These
specific grievances and the safeguards against their re-
currence were not defined by the Constitution. They
were defined by history. Their meaning was so settled by
history that definition was superfluous. Judicial enforce-
ment of the Constitution must respect these historic lim-
its. The prohibition of bills of attainder falls of course
among these very specific constitutional provisions.
Lovett, 328 U.S. at 321.
197 See discussion supra Part III.
198 See id.; Lovett, 328 U.S. at 321.
199 Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234 (1872);
Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277; Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 333. These cases involved post Civil War laws that re-
quired individuals to take oaths that they had previously not
supported the Confederacy. Id.; see also Brown, 381 U.S. 437
(invalidating a law denying Communist Party members from
holding various union positions); Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946)
(invalidating a law which prohibited appropriations to gov-
ernment employees found to be subversives).
200 See Pierce, 83 U.S. at 234; Cummings, 71 U.S. 277; Ex
parte Garland, 71 U.S. at 333; Brown, 381 U.S. at 437.
201 See discussion supra Part III.
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B. Prong One: Specificity
1. The Bill of Attainder Clause Was Not Intended to
Apply to Corporations
The District Court in SBC Communications in-
cluded corporations within groups or citizens tra-
ditionally protected from bills of attainder.20 2
The court failed to engage in an analysis of past
bill of attainder precedent. 203 It did however, as-
sert that because corporations receive other con-
stitutional protections, it must be logical to con-
clude that corporations can be afforded bill of
attainder protection. 20 4 The court ignored the
Supreme Court's cautioning in Nixon that the Bill
of Attainder Clause is not to be used as a substi-
tute for the Equal Protection Clause.205 Also, the
District Court ignored the Supreme Court's deter-
mination that the Bill of Attainder Clause does
not prevent Congress from enacting laws that sin-
gle out small groups.20 6 As explained by Lau-
rence Tribe, the specificity requirement of the
Bill of Attainder Clause is limited, allowing Con-
gress to impose restrictions on named groups in
appropriate circumstances. 20 7
Citing Brown, the District Court stated the Bill
of Attainder Clause must be read broadly.20 8
However, the Supreme Court's functional analysis
has actually been read narrowly.2119 The last time
the Court expanded the definition of the Bill of
202 SBC Communications, 981 F. Supp. at 1003 (finding
that the Supreme Court has not addressed whether corpo-
rate entities are protected under the Bill of Attainder
Clause).
203 See id. at 1003 n.4.
204 See id.
205 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 471.
206 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 242
(1995) (Breyer, J. concurring); see also Defendants' Memo-
randum, supra note 72, at 2.
207 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, 644 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter TRIBE]; see Defendants'
Memorandum, supra note 72, at 2; see also United Nuclear
Corp. v. Cannon, 553 F. Supp. 1220, 1227 (D.R.I. 1982)
(finding the Bill of Attainder Clause did not apply to a corpo-
ration).
208 See SBC Communications, 981 F. Supp. at 1004.
209 See supra note 196.
210 See Cummings, 71 U.S. at 323.
211 See id.
212 See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 778-81 (1978) (holding that a Massachusetts statute that
limited corporations from contributing to electoral cam-
paigns violated the First Amendment); but cf Cannon, 553 F.
Supp. at 1220 (stating that the Bill of Attainder Clause was
not applicable to a corporation).
213 See supra note 196.
Attainder Clause was during the Civil War era in
Cummings v. Missouri.2 ° The functional clarifica-
tion of the Bill of Attainder Clause by the Cum-
mings Court was not in fact a broader reading of
the clause, but rather a limited extension to pro-
tect politically unpopular groups singled out for
their beliefs. 2
11
Whether a constitutional provision is available
for the benefit of corporations depends on the
nature, history, and purpose of that provision.
212
Corporations are considerably different from the
politically subversive citizens or groups the clause
was intended to protect.21 3 The application of the
bill of attainder to disfavored groups stems from
the Framers' intent to protect political entities
from oppression.2 14  Therefore, the specificity
component of the bill of attainder analysis was ex-
tended to its limit in Cummings.2 15 An inclusion
of telecommunications companies into the
groups the clause was written to protect is a con-
siderable leap from the Court's earlier inclusion
of politically disfavored in Cummings.21 6
Second, for the bill of attainder specificity anal-
ysis to be satisfied, a statute requires that an indi-
vidual or group maintain a characteristic that can
be singled out as both "specific" and as "fixed"
(an immutable past behavior or affiliation).
2 1 7
The amorphous nature of the corporate entity
generally does not allow it to be considered a
214 The Framers intent for the Bill of Attainder Clause to
be a protective device against political persecution is best il-
lustrated through their personal experiences. ThomasJeffer-
son had his own bitter experience with a bill of attainder dur-
ing the prelude to the American Revolution. See THE LIFE
AND SELECTrED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 11 (Adrienne
Koch & William Peden eds., 1944). Jefferson wrote in his Au-
tobiography that in 1774, his authoring of "A Summary View
of the Rights of British America" earned him the distinction
of having his name inserted in "a long list of proscriptions,
enrolled in a bill of attainder commenced in one of the
houses of Parliament, but suppressed in embry by the hasty
step of events, which warned them to be a little cautious." Id.
Jefferson notes that the bill included Adamses, John Han-
cock, and Peyton Randolph. See id.
215 See Cummings, 71 U.S. at 277.
216 See Griffith, supra note 14, at 502-3.
217 See TRIBE, supra note 207, at 655 ("[T]he most basic
test" of a bill of attainder is that the statute must "single out
or 'specify' a fixed class of persons for disadvantageous treat-
ment"); see also Tim Sloan, Creating Better Incentives Through
Regulation: Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934 and the
Promotion of Local Exchange Competition, 50 FED. COMM. L.J.
310, 314 (1998) [hereinafter "Sloan"] (discussing the 'spe-
cific' and 'fixed' requirement of the Bill of Attainder
Clause).
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closed class with either "specific" or "fixed" char-
acteristics. Mergers and acquisitions allow mem-
bers to exit and enter the corporate entity. The
BOCs named in the 1996 Act have already
changed their characteristics from those named
in the Special Provisions, or in the 1982 MFJ. For
example, Southern New England Telephone
("SNET") was not made subject to the Special
Provisions; however, after being acquired by SBC
Communications, SNET is now subject to those
requirements.2 1 8 Also, the seven RBOCs have be-
come five RBOCs as a result of mergers within
that group. 219 In contrast, where a person was a
member of the Communist party is a past charac-
teristic that can never be altered. However, cor-
porations can redefine themselves and lose char-
acteristics. Therefore, when the conduct being
protected stems from past violations that are not
traditionally protected liberties, such the feloni-
ous activity in Cummings,220 then the group speci-
fied will not receive bill of attainder protection. 22 1
Also, as the Supreme Court noted in Selective
Service, Congress did not legislate against non-reg-
istrants on the basis of their political association,
but rather to ensure compliance with draft regis-
tration requirements. 222 In SBC Communications,
the situation is even more specific. Again, Con-
gress has not imposed action against political ac-
tivity, but has merely maintained certain 1982 MFJ
restrictions in order to ensure a fair, orderly, and
competitive marketplace.
2 23
Furthermore, BOCs have mutable characteris-
tics in a different way. The District Court in SBC
Communications held that the Special Provisions
stripped the BOCs of the ability to enter a new
market.2 24 The court failed to determine, how-
ever, that in order to strip the BOCs of their
rights, they must have previously had the ability to
provide inter-exchange service. 225 The purpose
of the Special Provisions was primarily to allow the
218 See Mike Mills, The Bells'Fastest Operator, SBC's $5.8 Bil-
lion Offer for Conn. Phone Company Reflects the Aggressiveness of
CEO Whiteacre, WASH. PosT, Jan. 6, 1998, at D1.
219 See id.
220 See supra notes 115-124, at 28-30.
221 See Griffith, supra note 14, at 502-03.
222 See Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 855-56.
223 See 47 U.S.C. § 271 (Supp. 1997).
224 See SBC Communications, 981 F. Supp. at 1005.
225 See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 227-28.
226 See id.; see 47 U.S.C. § 271 (Supp. 1997).
227 See Bork, supra note 100, at 24.
228 See H.R. REP. No. 102-850, at 92 (1992).
229 See Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 849-50.
BOCs into the long distance market, a right or
privilege they have not enjoyed since their crea-
tion during divestiture. 226 To indicate, pursuant
to Judge Kendall's discussion that they are inno-
cent corporations whose only downfall was
AT&T's reign over them extends the analysis be-
yond its proper parameters. 227  Congress in-
tended not to impose punishment, but rather to
deregulate them through a set of carefully crafted
long distance entry requirements. 228
2. The Escape Clause
The specificity analysis also fails the revised
functional approach enunciated in Selective Ser-
vice.229 In Selective Service, the Court stressed that
only complete barriers to entry into a profession
can be challenged as an impermissible bill of at-
tainder.230 The District Court found the Special
Provisions, unlike the registration requirement in
Selective Service were "onerous" and impossible to
satisfy. 231 By declaring the 1996 Act itself was a
complete barrier to long distance entry, the Dis-
trict Court improperly ignored the Court's analy-
sis in Selective Service.232 Instead, careful analysis of
the extensive legislative history is required which
explains that the Special Provisions were intended
to establish an easily attainable goal for BOCs in-
terested in providing in-region inter-exchange
service. 233 Numerous Senators stated that these
requirements could be easily satisfied. Senator
Kerrey expressed concern whether these require-
ments could be fulfilled without promoting the
intended local competition benefits for the con-
sumer.234 Moreover, other Senators were certain
that BOCs would be able to satisfy the checklist
shortly after the 1996 Act was passed. 235 One Sen-
ator was concerned that the checklist was too leni-
ent.2 36 In addition, while no 271 applications
have been approved yet by the FCC, that does not
230 See id. at 850-51.
231 See SBC Communications, 981 F. Supp. at 1007.
232 See id.
233 See id.
234 See 141 CONG. REc. S8444 (daily ed. June 15, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Kerrey); see generally Sloan, supra note 217,
at 316-18 (discussing the extensive legislative history of the
1996 Act that addressed the competitive aspects of Section
271).
235 See 141 CONG. REC. S713 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Breaux).
236 See 141 CONG. REC. S7888 (daily ed. June 7, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Pressler).
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necessarily mean that the competitive checklist is
impossible to satisfy. On the contrary, the BOCs'
271 applications have been criticized by the FCC
for their failure to comply with competitive entry
requirements rather then checklist failures.
23 7
Nevertheless, the first BOC is expected to be al-
lowed to provide long distance service within its
service region by the year's end. 238 The FCC has
sought to make their 271 review process more
"user friendly" and in an effort to reduce adminis-
trative burdens and promote market entry. 231
The latter examples all offer support for the
specificity requirement of bill of attainder juris-
prudence to be fulfilled under the functional
analysis illustrated in Selective Service. The 271
checklist was intended by Congress to be an easy
prerequisite to satisfy, and shortly its require-
ments will be satisfied.
C. Prong Two: Punishment Under the
Restrained Functional Analysis
Within its past two decisions of Nixon and Selec-
tive Service, the Supreme Court has focused on
three elements to determine if legislation is extra-
judicial punishment or appropriate regulation. 240
In applying the three-prong punishment test, the
Court has stressed that "each case has turned on
its own highly particularized context."24 1 Quite
simply, this test follows the narrow approach
taken by Justice Frankfurter years earlier in study-
ing each unique case. 242 There are three ways
punishment may be considered unconstitutional.
237 See, e.g., In re Application of SBC Communications,
Inc. et al Pursuant to Section 271 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in the
State of Oklahoma, CC Dkt. No. 97-121 (May 16,1997). The
FCC's order regarding a 271 application was critical of SBC's
evidence for competition within Oklahoma. See id. SBC ar-
gued that a CLEC that was offering resale of local service on
a limited test basis constituted competition under Section
271. See id. The FCC found this argument strongly lacking
evidence in establishing local competition has arrived in
Oklahoma. See id.
238 See Mike Mills, Bell Atlantic May Gain Long-Distance En-
tree in N.Y, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 1998 at HI. Even staunch
critics of Bell Atlantic's entry into long distance have ac-
knowledged that it appears to be meeting the 271 competi-
tive requirements. See id. This is mainly because competition
in the New York area is more prevalent than in the other
BOC service regions. See id.
239 See Wake Up Call: FCC Commissioner Michael Powell Calls
For A New Collaborative Approach to Section 271 Applications (Jan.
15, 1998). Commissioner Powell stressed the need for an in-
dustry wide solution. Competition, he declared, could only
First, if the legislation falls into the Framers' nar-
row interpretation which addressed only tradi-
tional punishments at the time the Constitution
was written, then the act will be considered a bill
of attainder. 243  Second, applying a restrained
functional approach, the Court will not find a bill
of attainder to exist if the legislative provisions
further non-punitive goals. 2 4 4 Third, the Court
examines the legislative history to determine if
there is any Congressional intent to punish the
specified individuals or group. 245 All three tests
contain a common theme: impermissible legisla-
tive punishment. Clearly, the Court is not con-
cerned with permissible burdens or escapable bar-
riers, but only with the impermissible punishment
forbidden by the Framers through their inclusion
of the Bill of Attainder Clause into the Constitu-
tion.
2 4 6
1. Is The Burden Imposed Similar to Historical Bills
of Attainder?
Economic regulation has traditionally been
viewed as non-punitive. 247 The SBC Communica-
tions court, however, found the 271 checklist was a
prohibition of entry into employment.248 Em-
ployment, the court reasoned, is a traditionally
protected liberty.249 However, barring an individ-
ual from employment has been found constitu-
tional even during the era of the Court's strict his-
toricism. 250  Therefore, bill of attainder
jurisprudence requires that a motivational intent
accompany the punishment. That intent must
incur if cooperatives efforts exist between the FCC, CLECs,
and ILECs. See id.; see also Bryan Gruley and Stephanie N.
Mehta, FCC Offers to Try to Help Baby Bells, WALL ST. J. Jan. 15,
1998, at A3.
240 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475-76 (applying both a histori-
cal and functional analysis); Selective Serv., 468 U.S. 841 at
853-54.
241 Selective Ser., 468 U.S. at 852 (quoting Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 616 (1960)).
242 See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 322; see also Griffith, supra note
14, at 477 (discussing Justice Frankfurter's historical ap-
proach to the bill of attainder analysis).
243 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475-76.
244 See id.
245 See id.
246 See Restaino, supra note 144, at 790.
247 See, e.g., FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad.,
436 U.S. 775 (1978).
248 See SBC Communications, 981 F. Supp. at 1006.
249 See id.
25) See, e.g., Hawker, 170 U.S. 189 (1898); Dent, 129 U.S.
114 (1889).
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amount to a denial of employment due to polit-
ical association. 251 When denial of employment is
associated with a valid legislative objective, how-
ever, the historical analysis consistently fails.
25 2
Therefore, even if employment under prong one
is encompassed into the punishment analysis,
prong two fails because the Special Provisions
were not enacted as a result of the BOCs' political
association. Congress denied the BOCs' immedi-
ate entry into long distance because Congress
wanted first to ensure greater competition within
the local telephone market.
253
2. Under A Functional Test, Can the Burdens
Imposed by the 1996 Act Be Found To Further
Non-punitive Legislative Purposes?
In SBC Communications, the court concluded
that the intent of Congress in the Special Provi-
sions was to penalize the BOC for the "sins of
their parent, AT&T." 254 Such an intent could not
be found to further non-punitive purposes.
2 55
Unfortunately, this argument was assisted by the
Defendant, the FCC, in their opposing brief, argu-
ing that the Act was intended to promote anti-
competitive activity. 2 5 6 Therefore, the court did
not have to look very far to conclude that the Spe-
cial Provisions convict the BOCs of anti-competi-
tive activities before they occur.257 Further, the
court determined that other parts of the 1996 Act
accomplished any Congressional intent of increas-
ing competition for the entire telecommunica-
tions marketplace. 258 The court determined that
251 See, e.g., Cummings, 71 U.S. 277; see Ex Parte Garland,
71 U.S. 333; Brown, 381 U.S. 437; Lovett, 328 U.S. 303; but see
Nixon, 433 U.S. 425; Selective Serv., 468 U.S. 841; Hawker, 170
U.S. 189; Dent, 129 U.S. 114.
252 See supra notes 126 - 134 and accompanying text.
253 See generally 47 U.S.C. § 271 (1996).
254 SBC Communications, 981 F. Supp. at 1005.
255 See id. (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475) ("Where such
reasonable purposes do not appear, it is reasonable to con-
clude that punishment of the individuals disadvantaged by




259 See SBC Communications, 981 F. Supp. at 1005.
260 See id.; Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475-76.
261 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 471 n.32. "The fact that harm is
inflicted by governmental authority does not make it punish-
ment. Figuratively speaking all discomforting action may be
deemed punishment because it deprives of what otherwise
would be enjoyed. But there may be reasons other than pu-
Congress' general competitive rules in the more
targeted Special Provisions treated the BOCs dif-
ferently from other similarly situated carriers.
259
Such severe treatment, concluded the District
Court, could not promote non-punitive pur-
poses. 260 However, the District Court failed to de-
lineate that harm inflicted by a governmental au-
thority does not necessarily denote
punishment.261 There may be other reasons
which legitimize a non-punitive intent.26 2 When
other non-punitive legitimate purposes exist for
disenfranchising a named group of their previ-
ously enjoyed fights, the legislature has not ex-
ceeded the Bill of Attainder Clause.
263
The court's rejection of the FCC's pro-competi-
tive argument can be repudiated upon examina-
tion of the 1996 Act's legislative history. Con-
gress' purpose for imposing the 271 checklist on
the BOCs was not punitive, but based instead on
numerous other considerations, such as the geo-
graphical position of the BOCs.
264
The safeguards were not aimed at punishing
the BOCs; the legislative purpose was aimed at
providing the consumers with a choice of local
service in the most congested phone markets.
265
The BOCs' control of urban areas distinguishes
them from other ILECs. 266 Congress deemed the
satisfaction of the checklist necessary to spur com-
petition in these urban areas, which are signifi-
cantly different from those controlled by other
ILECs. 26 7 Under the functional analysis, legisla-
tion enacted for geographical reasons can easily
be found to further non-punitive purposes.
nitive for such deprivation." Id.
262 See id.
263 See id.
264 See H.R. REP. No. 102-850, 94 (Aug. 12 1992). "Each
RBOC controls essential local exchange facilities in all, or vir-
tually all, the major metropolitan areas in its geographic rea-
son. As courts have found, each of the RBOCs has market
power significantly greater than the only other comparably
sized local exchange carrier, in that GTE's widely dispersed
exchanges are primarily rural and suburban in character and
otherwise differ from the RBOCs." Id. (citing United States v.
GTE, 603 F. Supp. 730 (D.D.C. 1984).
265 See H.R. REP. No. 104-204, at 50 (1995); cf LEE L. SEL
WYN, ET AL., ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY, INC., THE 'CON-
NECTICUT EXPERIENCE' WITH TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPETI-
TION, A CASE STUDY IN GETTING IT WRONG 39-40 (1998)
(concluding that since SNET is exempt from the incentives
of the Special Provisions, it has no reason to remove existing
barriers to local competition).




3. Does the Legislative History of the 1996 Act
Establish a Congressional Intent to Punish?
The District Court in SBC Communications once
again focused on the transition of telecommuni-
cations policy making authority from the courts to
the legislature as evidence of Congressional intent
to punish. 2
68
A more in-depth examination of the legislative
history reveals that Congress was careful to craft
the 1996 Act to avoid any subsequent construction
of it as a punitive mechanism.
First, the District Court did not even consider
that the RBOCs themselves continuously lobbied
Congress to enact the Special Provisions.2 69 SBC's
lawsuit can only be construed as assisting in writ-
ing the law it now abhors. 270 A punitive legislative
intent cannot exist, however, when that legisla-
ture supported by the group it affects.
If the District Court's decision stands, SBC Com-
munications will gain the notorious distinction of
the first bill of attainder case where the group at-
tempting to declare the statute unconstitutional
assisted in inflicting the legislative act upon itself.
Second, Congress was alerted that the proposed
version of the 1996 Act might be interpreted as a
bill of attainder as early as 1992.271 As a result, it
held extensive hearings with constitutional schol-
ars in order to develop the Special Provisions.2 72
Notably, Congress relied on Johnny H. Killian's
exhaustive refutation of the bill of attainder argu-
268 See SBC Communications, 981 F. Supp. at 1006.
269 See H.R. REP. 102-850, at n.491 (Aug. 12, 1992). The
BOCs hired Robert Pitofsky to refute the bill of attainder
claim. See id. Mr. Pitofsky stated relevant case law permitted
Congress to remove or modify the 1982 MFJ. See id.
270 Judge Kendall has been characterized as possessing
disdain for government and the special interests associated it.
See Ann Davis, Maverick Judge in Telecom Case Bucks System,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 1998, at B. In forum shopping, SBC
Communications was criticized for taking such a significant
piece of legislation away from the U.S. Court of Appeals in
Washington D.C. which traditionally hears telecommunica-
tions cases and filing it in a court that is far removed and
unfamiliar with such complex law. See id.
271 See H.R. REP. No. 102-850, at 92 (1992).
272 "These constitutional arguments against the MFJ and
H.R. 5096 have been rejected wholesale by other legal schol-
ars, and most pertinently, by Judge Greene as well." H.R. REP.
No. 102-850, at 92-93 (1992). Commenting on this Bill, Lau-
rence H. Tribe dismissed the distinction between regulatory
purpose and a punitive one, and stated any attempt to single
out the BOCs would violate basic constitutional principles be-
hind the Bill of Attainder Clause. See id. at 93.
273 See generally H.R. REP. 102-850 (1992).
274 See id.
275 See Kupfer, supra note 42.
ment.2 73 Further, only after taking into account
findings that a checklist would not violate the Bill
of Attainder Clause did Congress develop the Spe-
cial Provisions. Congress did so in an attempt to
avoid any future judicial determination that might
declare the Special Provisions to be punitive.
274
V. REGULATORY CHESS: SBC'S EFFORT TO
STALL THE 271 PROCESS
The Supreme Court has only found Acts to be
invalid bills of attainder during the Civil War and
the Cold War. Now, the U.S. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit will determine whether
it applies to the current communications wars.
275
In an attempt to shift authority regarding na-
tional telecommunications policy from the courts
to Congress, then to the FCC, the BOCs were key
players in the construction of the Special Provi-
sions. 276 Further, the RBOCs applauded the en-
actment of the Special Provisions. 277 However,
when their inadequate 271 applications were re-
jected, they cried foul.
278
SBC's action declaring the Special Provisions an
invalid bill of attainder amounts to frustration
over failure to achieve FCC approval.2 79 In a
costly gamble to have their cake and eat it too,
SBC abandoned the process for which they have
extensively lobbied. 28 0 This sends a conflicting
message to all corporations: lobby for the laws you
276 See Bork, supra note 100, at A22. For example, SBC
spent more than a decade lobbying Congress to enact the
Special Provisions. See id.
277 See id.
278 See id. In SBC's initial application, it still controlled
more than 99% of the local market. Id. Further, Chairman
Kennard critiqued SBC's applications in the following state-
ment:
We looked carefully at each application. Unfortunately,
none of them met the statutory requirements estab-
lished by Congress. Although the facts presented in
these applications were different, there was one com-
mon thread: the competing providers in each state did
not have the same access to the local network that the
Bell Company enjoys. Therefore, local market was not
open. Without the same access, competitors cannot pro-
vide customers with the same service and, therefore, cus-
tomers do not have a realistic choice of service provid-
ers.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Moving Towards Com-
petition Under Section 271 Before the Subcommittee on An-
titrust, Business Rights, and Competition, 105th Cong.
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think are in your best interest, but if the laws are
not implemented in a way most favorable to you,
ask the courts to declare them unconstitutional.
Such activity directly conflicts with the Supreme
Court's bill of attainder characterization laid out
in Nixon.21 The Bill of Attainder Clause is not a
tool that allows a defined group to escape bur-
dens that it dislikes. 2 2 Practically speaking, at
one time or another, a group will find itself ad-
versely affected by legislation.28 3 Nevertheless,
"realistic conceptions of classification and punish-
ment" traditionally associated with'the bill of at-
tainder doctrine cannot be expanded to invali-
date every act that imposes a restriction on a
group.
2 8 4
What SBC may not have realized is that if the
Special Provisions are found unconstitutional, the
1982 MFJ may be reinstated. 28 5 In that event, the
BOCs will be completed barred from long dis-
tance entry whether inside or outside their service
regions. 2 6
Until the Fifth Circuit renders a decision re-
garding the Special Provisions, in-region long dis-
tance entry will be further delayed for the BOCs.
Eventually, the transfer of authority from the 1982
MFJ to the FCC will occur. The real question is
whether the FCC will find that a 271 application
legitimately establishes local competition or
whether the FCC grants a 271 application to avoid
the judicial scrutiny it is receiving from the courts.
On the legislative front, Congress is also being
bogged down by the stalled 271 process. 28 7 As a
result, it is presently considering a bill that would
abolish the 271 entry provisions altogether.2 8 In
the meantime, the true victim in this debate is the




285 See id. "If SBC could somehow establish that the long-
distance provisions of the 1996 Act are unconstitutional, the
necessary consequence would be reinstatement of the court's
local service consumer, who continues to be de-
nied competitive local phone rates as a result of
corporate maneuvering.
VI. CONCLUSION
The BOCs involvement in the telecommunica-
tions industry since the implementation of the
1982 MFJ has been entertaining. For instance,
they enjoyed the benefit of monopolies within
their respective markets after the 1982 MFJ. In
the meantime, the BOCs stared longingly at the
monetary benefits that long distance service could
bring. After extensive lobbying, their wish was
granted in the 1996 Act. Unfortunately, in failing
to provide local competition they did not live up
to their end of their bargain.
Consequently, in a game of cat and mouse with
Congress and the FCC, they created an engaging
argument based on the contention that the Spe-
cial Provisions of the 1996 Act amounted to a bill
of attainder. After discussion of the limited
Supreme Court decisions that have found laws to
constitute a bill of attainder, it becomes clear that
the position of the BOCs falls well outside any le-
gitimate claim they may have. Specifically, they
have failed to satisfy either the necessary specific-
ity or punishment requirements for a bill of at-
tainder argument to succeed.
SBC's effort to stall the 271 process is filled with
strategic corporate maneuvers. In effect, it has
amounted to concessions by both the FCC and
Congress. Nevertheless, it continues to violate the
competitive spirit of the 1996 Act.
order, which contained more severe restrictions." Id.
286 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 470.
287 See S. 1766, 105th Cong. §§ 1, 3, 270 (1998).
288 Senator McCain recently introduced a bill to aiend
the 1996 Act and would allow the BOs to provide intrastate
and interstate telecommunications services one year after its
enactment. See id.
19981

